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Guaranteed Jurisdiction: The Emerging Role of
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) in the Acquisition of
Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign Nationals in
Internet Intellectual Property Disputes
Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Esq.**
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the negotiations over the terms of what would
later become the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, many less developed countries
bitterly complained that the United States was, along with
other more developed countries, attempting to exert domination
and control over the world marketplace for intellectual property
matters.1 While this controversy will no doubt continue to spur
endless debate, one inter-related issue that has quietly
undergone very interesting and substantial changes in the last
fifteen years is the extent to which U.S. courts may acquire
jurisdiction over non-U.S. citizens to determine Internet related
intellectual property disputes.
As will be examined more fully below, the largely
unnoticed enactment of FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (“RULE 4(k)(2)”)
provides a powerful tool for U.S. plaintiffs to bring
international owners of Internet web sites, who previously
would have been immune from suit, to U.S. courts. The effect
of this tool may offer U.S. citizens the very type of overarching
control over the worldwide marketplace for Internet based
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu.
** J.D. 1979, Albany Law School, L.L.M. expected 2004, Albany Law School.
Mr. Armstrong is an attorney practicing with Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg &
Griffin, P.C., Troy, New York. The author wishes to thank Professors Peter
Halewood and Pam Armstrong for their contributions to this article.
1. See, e.g., Lekshmi Sarma, Comment, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century
Imperialism in the Form of International Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 107, 118 (1999).
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intellectual property rights that less developed countries fear.
Part I of this article will examine general concepts of
jurisdiction as they have been applied to Internet transactions.
Part II will discuss the emergence of RULE 4(k)(2) and trace its
early development in non-Internet cases. Part III will examine
newly decided cases that apply RULE 4(k)(2) to Internet
intellectual property disputes and, in so doing, will
demonstrate the extraordinary breadth of jurisdiction this new
statute provides. Part IV will analyze the effect of this
jurisdictional development on international relations to the
extent that such development concerns intellectual property
matters. Finally, Part IV will also offer recommendations for
an international protocol standardizing the means by which
national courts determine how and when to assert jurisdiction
over foreign defendants. This protocol would minimize the
possibility of an escalating controversy between nations
concerning the inappropriate assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents.
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I. BACKGROUND OF RULE 4, PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Every analysis of modern federal jurisdiction must begin
with the 1963 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Revised FED. R. CIV. P. 4 allowed federal courts to acquire
personal jurisdiction over parties by incorporating the
particular jurisdictional rules of the state in which the federal
court was located.2 As a result, personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant could be obtained either by the physical
presence of that defendant in the forum state or by the
assertion of rights over a non-resident defendant under the
long-arm statute of the forum state.3 Thus, assuming that a
plaintiff did not have the exquisite luck of serving a nonresident defendant while that defendant was physically present
in the forum state, a federal court plaintiff would have to
borrow the applicable state long-arm statute, which would have
to meet the requisites of the Due Process clause of the United
States Constitution.
The seminal case that provided the methodology to
determine whether a particular state long-arm statute met the
standards of Due Process is International Shoe Co. v.
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court
Washington.4
articulated its famous requirement that the acquisition of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant (whether
out-of-state or international) must not offend “traditional
conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice.” The Court
also announced a two-part analysis, which focused on: (1)
whether there were sufficient minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state to justify the submission of the
defendant to jurisdiction; and (2) whether forcing the defendant
to defend a suit in the forum state would be “reasonable and
just.”5
International Shoe’s “minimum contacts” approach has
gradually evolved into two entirely separate forms of
jurisdictional analysis, one based on “general” jurisdictional
contacts and the other based on “specific” jurisdictional
contacts. A determination of whether general jurisdictional
contacts exist requires an analysis of whether a defendant’s
2.
3.
4.
5.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) 1963 advisory committee’s note.
Id.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 320.
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contacts with a jurisdictional forum were systematic and
continuous, while analysis of specific jurisdictional contacts
instead centers on the nexus between the transaction that was
the subject of the litigation and the forum state. Thus, under
specific jurisdictional analysis, jurisdiction could be found,
notwithstanding isolated or non-systemic contacts, so long as
there were contacts with the forum state that actually led to or
were a part of the cause of action at issue.6
Modern cases generally use a three-pronged test to
determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant is appropriate. In order to exercise
specific jurisdiction: “(1) the defendant must have sufficient
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state, (2) the claim asserted
against the defendant must arise out of those contacts, and (3)
the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.”7
However, for Internet disputes, where the minimum
contacts between the defendant and the forum state could be
entirely web-based, the traditional three-pronged test proved
insufficient. Ultimately, courts arrived at a new method for
determining specific jurisdiction minimum contacts. Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.8 has been widely
cited as the starting point for the analysis of whether an
Internet based presence within a forum state will fulfill the
minimum contacts test for specific jurisdiction.9 The Zippo
court’s contribution was to distinguish between web sites based
on a measurement of the “nature and quality of commercial
activity . . . conduct[ed] over the Internet.”10 The Zippo court
established a “sliding scale” test to determine whether and to
what extent an Internet web site creates interactivity with the
forum state.11 Under Zippo, “active” sites are those where
there is a knowing and repeated transmission of computer files
6. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1983).
7. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. Farino, 960 F.2d
1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992).
8. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
9. See., e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd
Cir. 2003) (observing that “[t]he opinion in [Zippo Mfg. Co.] has become a
seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of
an Internet web site”); cf Revelle v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2002)
(same).
10. Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
11. Id.
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between the site and the forum state.12 These repeated
transmissions compose constitutionally recognized minimum
contacts and thereby allow for personal jurisdiction.13
“Passive” sites, which only consist of posted information that
may be simply viewed over the Internet, will not.14 In the
middle are those interactive sites that exchange minimal
information with the forum state.15
Examples of cases that have found active web sites include
Zippo and CompuServe.16 In Zippo, the web site contained
“information about the company, advertisements and an
application for [the] Internet news service” owned by the
website operators.17 A prospective subscriber could fill out an
on-line application and pay for the service either via a supplied
phone number or through an interactive service on the site.18
Following payment, the subscriber was assigned a password,
and the site then acted as a portal for a user to view or
download Internet newsgroup messages stored on the
defendant’s web server.19 The Zippo court ruled that these
interactive transfers of information were part of a “conscious
choice” by the defendant to conduct business with residents of
the forum state and thereby sustained the Due Process test of
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction.20
Similarly, in CompuServe, the defendant transmitted
thirty-two separate “shareware” software programs to the
CompuServe system, physically located in the forum state of
Ohio, for others to use and purchase.21 The evidence also
revealed that a number of Ohio state residents downloaded and
purchased the shareware programs.22 The CompuServe court
held that these contacts created a purposeful transaction of
12. Id. at 1125.
13. Id. at 1124.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; cf. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (6th Cir.
1996). The court found that Patterson’s repeated transmissions were evidence
of purposeful availment of the state of Ohio (the definition of an “active” website for the purpose of this article) rather than an explicit finding of an “active”
web site.
17. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1126.
21. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261.
22. Id.
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business in Ohio: the defendant “chose to transmit software
from Texas [his home state] to CompuServe’s system in Ohio,
that myriad others gained access to [his] software via that
system, and that [the defendant] advertised and sold his
product through that system.”23
In contrast, Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.24 and Donmar,
Inc. v. Swanky Partners, Inc.25 held that, under the Zippo test,
the subject web site was merely passive and had insufficient
interactivity with the forum state. Cybersell involved a suit
between two companies operating under the same name, one
based in Arizona and the other in Florida.26 The defendant
(Cybersell Florida) maintained a web site that merely posted
information about the company and invited users to e-mail
them to obtain further information about the services it
offered.27 Donmar involved an out-of-state web site for a
nightclub
(with
the
tantalizing
domain
name
“www.theleopardlounge.com”), where the only interactivity
involved the web site’s ability to allow users to sign up for a
mailing list and to receive driving directions.28 Both the
Cybersell and Donmar courts held that the level of interactivity
of the web sites was insufficient to demonstrate the “purposeful
availment” of a forum state that was required by the U.S.
Constitution.29
Robbins v. Yutopian Enterprises, Inc.,30 is an interesting
middle ground case that demonstrates the true reach of the
Zippo sliding scale test. There, the web site of the defendant
not only actively advertised its “Go-Product” game, but took
orders directly over the Internet.31 Nevertheless, because only
a limited number of Internet transactions occurred between the
web site and residents of the forum state, the Robbins court
ruled that there were insufficient contacts to sustain
jurisdiction.32 The Robbins court also noted (in a comment that

23. Id. at 1264-65.
24. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
25. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15308 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2002).
26. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 414.
27. Id. at 415-416.
28. Donmar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15308, at *2.
29. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419-20; Donmar, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15308, at *11.
30. 202 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. Md. 2002).
31. Robbins, 202 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
32. Id.
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would prove to be highly ironic in view of the subsequent
enactment of RULE 4(k)(2)) that the assertion of jurisdiction in
such a case would be unfair, since it would effectively “mean
that [the defendant] would presumably be subject to general
personal jurisdiction [anywhere] in the country, thereby
allowing a plaintiff to sue it for any matter anywhere in the
The Robbins court observed that “[t]his, the
nation.”33
constitution does not permit.”34 As will be shown, the effect of
RULE 4(k)(2) means that a Robbins style defendant would be
subject to jurisdiction in every state in the United States.
Robbins is also noteworthy because the level of general
interactivity of the web site and the level of Internet file
transmission to and from the web site to other sites was not
critical to the court’s determination. Rather, the Robbins court
chose to focus on the level and intensity of that interactivity
measured by the particular contacts that the web site had with
the forum state.35 As this article notes in the discussion of the
applicability of RULE 4(k)(2), the Robbins court’s
transformation of the minimum contacts test to measure
national, as opposed to state-wide, contacts between the web
site and its target audience, will have substantial repercussions
on the outcome of jurisdictional contests in Internet related
intellectual property cases. For, as will be seen, once the
question of the amount of contacts between the web site and
target audience shifts from a state to a national level, the
jurisdictional reach vastly expands as well.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF RULE 4(K)(2)
RULE 4(k)(2), enacted and effective on December 1, 1993,
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of
service is also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal
law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
general jurisdiction of any state.36

The rule thus provides that a plaintiff may acquire
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident (whether out-of-state
33. Id. (citing Atlantech Distrib., Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp.
2d 534, 537 (D. Md. 1998)).
34. Id. (citing Atlantech Distrib., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 537).
35. Id.
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (2003).
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or a foreign national) in any federal district within the United
States if the following criteria are met: (1) the plaintiff’s claim
against the defendant is based on a federal question; (2) the
defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole are
sufficient so as not to violate Fifth Amendment concerns
regarding Due Process and the need for minimum contacts; and
(3) the defendant is not otherwise subject to personal
jurisdiction of any state within the United States.
Interestingly, RULE 4(k)(2) was enacted as a result of a
suggestion by the U.S. Supreme Court to Congress in Omni
Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co.37 There, the Court
held that personal jurisdiction was lacking because of
insufficient contacts between an English defendant and the
forum state in a Federal Securities Act lawsuit brought by
Louisiana residents.
The Court broadly hinted that an
amendment allowing jurisdiction in a federal question case
would be appropriate, and impliedly, constitutional.38
One of the first cases to apply RULE 4(k)(2) was Eskofot
A/S v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.39 Eskofot involved a
federal anti-trust claim, where the plaintiff, a Danish
corporation, alleged that the defendant, a British corporation,
was attempting to monopolize “the domestic and international
market for certain printing equipment and materials.”40 The
Eskofot court found that personal jurisdiction existed under
RULE 4(k)(2).41 It therefore did not consider other possible
bases for jurisdiction. In order to decide whether the defendant
had the constitutionally required minimum contacts such that
defendant was amenable to personal jurisdiction in New York
federal courts, the Eskofot court adopted, for RULE 4(k)(2)
purposes, the analysis previously used by the Second Circuit to
interpret New York’s long arm statute prior to the enactment of
37. 484 U.S. 97, 109, 111 (1987).
38. The Omni Capital Court reasoned that:
A narrowly tailored service of process provision [in the Federal
Rules], authorizing service on an alien in a federal-question case
when the alien is not amenable to service under the applicable state
long-arm statute, might well serve the ends of the CEA [Commodities
Exchange Act] and other federal statutes. It is not for the federal
courts, however, to create such a rule as a matter of common law.
That responsibility, in our view, better rests with those who propose
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with Congress.
Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 111.
39. 872 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
40. Id. at 83.
41. Id. at 87.
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RULE 4(k)(2).42 Under this analysis, the Eskofot court asked
whether, as to a foreign national, (1) the defendant transacted
business in the United States; (2) whether it did an act in the
United States; or (3) whether there was “an effect in the United
States caused by an act done elsewhere.”43
The Eskofot court centered on the third factor and held
that sufficient facts had been presented by the plaintiff to at
least raise a question of fact as to whether the defendant had
engaged in anti-competitive activities that significantly affected
the United States market.44 The court sustained jurisdiction,
at least for purposes of denying a motion to dismiss.45
Critical analysis of Eskofot reveals an extraordinarily
expansive view of RULE 4(k)(2). The plaintiff alleged only that
defendants “have the capacity to” and “currently sell a certain
percentage” of their products in the United States.46 The
plaintiff did not allege any purposeful activity whatsoever
within the United States except for the assertion that “a
certain percentage” of products were sold and sent to a point of
origin within the United States.47 Nevertheless, the Eskofot
court held that a prima facie case of jurisdiction was
established.48 The Eskofot factors have been followed by a
number of courts in later cases.49
Surprisingly, the trend set in motion by Eskofot continued.
Subsequent cases have uniformly followed this expansive view
of the reach of RULE 4(k)(2), often with scant support in the
pleaded facts of the cases on the issue of minimum contacts
aside from the sale of products to points within the United
States. For example, in Szafarowicz v. Golterup,50 the court
held that a foreign defendant might be amenable to jurisdiction

42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972)).
44. Id. at 88.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 86.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 945 F. Supp. 609,
617 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (establishing jurisdiction over foreign corporation arising
solely from effects in the United States of actions taken in another country);
see also Szafarowicz v. Gotterup, 68 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D. Mass. 1999)
(allowing limited “jurisdictional discovery” to determine whether the Eskofot
factors were satisfied).
50. 68 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D. Mass. 1999).
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merely as a result of the targeting of U.S. customers through
magazine advertisements and the use of a booking agent within
The court in
the United States for U.S. customers.51
Szafarowicz did hint at one limitation to its grant of
jurisdiction under RULE 4(k)(2). It found that jurisdiction did
not exist for all purposes, but merely for discovery purposes.52
The court stated that discovery should be permitted to find out
if defendant had generated “significant business through its
To that end, the
marketing in the United States.”53
Szafarowicz court permitted the plaintiff to engage in
“jurisdictional discovery.”54
Perhaps the most remarkable example of the looseness
with which RULE 4(k)(2) has been construed may be found in
United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd.55 This case arose when
the U.S. government attempted to enforce a forfeiture action
against John Fitzgerald, a U.S. citizen.56 Fitzgerald had
deposited sums in overseas bank accounts, including some in
the Swiss American Bank branch in Antigua.57 The U.S.
government alleged that Swiss American had disbursed sums
in disregard of constructive notice of the government’s claim.58
The U.S. government reasoned that constructive notice was the
result of publications pertaining to the forfeiture in newspapers
of general circulation in Antigua.59 The U.S. government
commenced a claim against Swiss American in the United
States District Court in New York, asserting conversion, unjust
enrichment, and breach of contract.60 The defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, alleging that Swiss
American did not conduct or solicit business within the United
States and did not have any of its accounts or assets located
within the United States.61 John Fitzgerald also opened the
accounts while physically in Antigua.62
51. Szafarowicz, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 42.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 191 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 35.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 23 F. Supp. 2d 130, 132 (D.
Mass. 1998)..
61. Id. at 133.
62. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F. 3d at 38.
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While in the end the case was dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction,63 in this proceeding the court vacated the
lower court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds.
First, the court determined that
jurisdiction would not be properly based upon the
Massachusetts long-arm statute allowing personal jurisdiction
over persons who cause injury within Massachusetts when they
conduct, solicit or derive substantial revenue from a business
conducted within the state.64 The Swiss Am. Bank court held
that these requirements simply were not met under the
circumstances of the case.65 However, when the court turned to
an analysis of whether or not the Federal courts had personal
jurisdiction under RULE 4(k)(2), an entirely different analysis
ensued.
Noting the order and allocation of the burden of proof in
respect to the negation requirement of RULE 4(k)(2), the Swiss
Am. Bank court determined for the first time that when a
plaintiff seeks to invoke RULE 4(k)(2), he or she can make a
prima-facie case for the applicability of the rule by simply
alleging the following: “(1) that the claim asserted arises under
federal law, (2) that personal jurisdiction is not available under
any situation-specific federal statute, and (3) that the putative
defendant’s contacts with the nation as a whole suffice to
satisfy the applicable constitutional requirements.”66 The court
stated that “[t]he plaintiff . . . must certify that, based on the
information that is readily available to the plaintiff and his
counsel, the defendant is not subject to suit in the court of
general jurisdiction of any state.”67 If the plaintiff establishes a
prima-facie case, the burden will then shift to the defendant to
provide evidence that, if credited, would have to illustrate
either that (a) the defendant would be subject to suit under at
least one state long-arm jurisdiction statute and thus be
amenable to jurisdiction in one or more state forums, or (b) that
its contacts with the United States were “constitutionally
insufficient.”68Applying this newly crafted burden-shifting
approach to the facts at hand, the Swiss Am. Bank court
63. United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 116 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass.
2000), aff’d, 274 F.3d 610 (1st Cir. 2001).
64. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F. 3d at 38.
65. Id. at 37-38.
66. Id. at 41.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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decided that the determination of whether the defendant had
adequate contacts within the United States as a whole to
support jurisdiction was a question that required pretrial
discovery. Therefore, the Swiss Am. Bank court vacated both
the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the denial
of the plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery.69
The Swiss Am. Bank court then used a remarkable
analysis to convert what was in essence a common law claim of
conversion into a claim under “federal common law”. The court
theorized that when the United States sued an alleged
converter of a U.S. government check, the right of the
government to recoup such assets found its roots in, and had to
be adjudicated in accordance with, the federal source.70 In
other words, since the authority of the United States to gain
title to the disputed funds flowed from its federal power to
punish criminals, the right to require forfeiture of racketeering
proceeds consequently created, in the eyes of the court, a
“federal source” for the authority of the government to bring a
claim for conversion; thus, the claim “arises under” federal
law.71
Swiss Am. Bank apparently indicates that, under
RULE 4(k)(2), a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit against a foreign
defendant in federal court on a federal question claim (the
subject of which may even be newly minted by the reviewing
court as “arising under” federal common law) with absolutely
no need to allege concrete facts that would demonstrate that
defendant is properly subject to personal jurisdiction. All that
is necessary is a statement that it is possible that a plaintiff
may later prove, after limited jurisdictional discovery, that that
defendant has minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole.
This is clearly an extraordinary holding and
demonstrates an exceedingly expansive view of federal
jurisdiction, though one that has been cited with approval by a
number of courts outside the First Circuit.72

69. Id. at 42.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 42-45.
72. See, e.g., Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC, 47 Fed. Appx. 73, 75 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also Graduate Mgmt. Admissions Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp.
2d 589, 597 (E.D. Va. 2003); Sunshine Distrib. v. Sport Auth. Mich., Inc, 157
F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Haemoscope Corp. v. Pentapharm AG, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23387 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2002); In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2000).
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As may be seen in the following section, which discusses
the application of RULE 4(k)(2) to Internet cases, the expanded
jurisdictional reach of this statute set in motion by Swiss Am.
Bank has continued and, when applied to the unique issues
that involve the Internet, has had profound consequences.
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III. APPLICATION OF RULE 4(K)(2) TO INTERNET CASES
To date, only a handful of courts have directly applied
RULE 4(k)(2) to cases arising out of Internet intellectual
property disputes. One of the first to address this issue is
Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd.73 The Quokka Sports
court examined a claim for trademark infringement based on
defendant’s registration and use of the domain name
“americascup.com” by the defendant.74 The court observed that
the level of interactivity of the defendant’s web site was
minimal.75 No product was being sold except advertising spots
on the website itself.76 No particular part of the web site
supplied specific information about the availability and cost of
such advertised space; it was necessary to e-mail the owners in
order to obtain this information.77 The web site did, however,
contain a travel section that offered cruises along the
racecourse.78 The consumers could fill out an on-line order
form and purchase a travel packet.79 Nevertheless, the court
determined that these allegations were sufficient to set forth
“interactive commercial activity’ and thus constituted positive
evidence of “purposeful availment” for the purpose of satisfying
the jurisdictional test of RULE 4(k)(2).80
The Quokka Sports court also determined that inasmuch
as it appeared that no particular state was being targeted by
defendant’s web site, their U.S. contacts should be considered
in aggregate.81 Thus, considering all contacts throughout the
United States in conformance with RULE 4(k)(2),82 the Quokka
Sports court held that personal jurisdiction was properly
established.83 Thus, from the very beginning, it became clear
that courts were inclined to take an expansive view of RULE
4(k)(2) as it applied to Internet related matters.
Another example of this expansive view may be found in
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

99 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1107-8.
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1110-12, 1114.
Id. at 1110, 1114.
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Toys “R” Us, Inc., v. Step Two S.A.84 In Toys “R” Us, the
allegations of interactivity between the Spanish defendant’s
website and the United States were exceedingly sparse: the
websites themselves were in Spanish; all prices for goods sold
via the Internet site were in Spanish pesetas and Buros; and
the websites provided a contact phone number that lacked the
country code that an overseas resident would need to dial.85
Nevertheless, the court denied the motion to dismiss and
granted jurisdictional discovery to allow for the possibility that
“something else” could be unearthed in discovery that would
sustain jurisdiction.86
Perhaps the most stunning example of this expansive view
of jurisdiction is found in the recent case of Graduate Mgmt.
Admission Council v. Raju.87 In this case the defendant, a
citizen of India, registered the domain names “GMATPlus.com”
and “GMATPlus.net.”88 The domain names were used to
operate a foreign web site that sold test preparation material in
The
violation of U.S. copyright and trademark laws.89
Graduate Mgmt. court, presuming plaintiff’s pleading to be
true, found that the defendant’s web site facilitated ordering
materials through a two-step process that combined a money
transfer arrangement through a third party with on-line
ordering
through
the
defendant’s
e-mail
address.90
Interestingly, the ordering information appeared to facilitate
world-wide orders, but according to the Graduate Mgmt. court,
the defendant’s website placed special emphasis on the United
States and Canada.91
The Graduate Mgmt. court found that the defendant’s
84. 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003).
85. Id. at 449-450.
86. Id. at 457.
87. 241 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Va. 2003).
88. Id. at 590-91
89. Id. at 590. The plaintiff had already established a right to copyright
and trademark relief. The only issue before the court was whether personal
jurisdiction could be properly exercised. The case involved a defaulting
defendant. The court, therefore, presumed that the factual allegations made
by the plaintiff were true.
90. Id. at 591.
91. Id. This was because the website provided a toll free number for
contacting the third party to facilitate the money transfer (Western Union or
MoneyGram). The number was for use solely in the United States or Canada.
No countries other that the U.S. or Canada are mentioned on the site, and
three of the six testimonials found on the site are from customers purportedly
within the U.S. Id.
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contacts with the forum state (Virginia) satisfied the state’s
long-arm statute because the defendant had caused a tortious
injury (interference with a trademark) within the state and had
regularly solicited business through the website.92 These facts
were not, however, sufficient to pass a Due Process
examination.93 In explaining the jurisdictional findings, the
Graduate Mgmt. court first held that mere registration of the
domain name with a company located in the state did not
support personal jurisdiction.94 Second, the court noted that
potential indirect injuries sustained by colleges and
universities that rely on GMAT scores were too indirect and
diffuse to support a finding that the defendant specifically
targeted Virginia.95 Though the Graduate Mgmt. court held
that the shipment of materials to two Virginia customers was
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, the court did note that the
question was a close one.96 Finally, the court determined that
the targeting of GMAC, a company located in Virginia, was
insufficient to ground jurisdiction because there was no
indication that the defendant could “reasonably anticipate
being hauled into court” in Virginia since there was no showing
that he was even aware of the company’s existence, let alone its
existence in Virginia.97
Up to that point the Graduate Mgmt. court’s analysis was
relatively standard.98 However, the second part of the opinion
is nothing short of remarkable.
The court, sua sponte,
determined that there was an alternative basis for personal
jurisdiction in the case under RULE 4(k)(2).99 The Graduate
Mgmt. court specifically noted that this matter was “not raised
92. Id. at 592-93. The Virginia long-arm statute specifically allows for
personal jurisdiction over a person “causing tortious injury in this
Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this Commonwealth.” Id. at 593.
93. Id. at 595.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 596.
98. It is important to recognize that Graduate Mgnt. concerns a default
application; this was a lawsuit filed against a defendant who failed to appear
at court. Id. at 592. This case was an appeal from a U.S. Magistrate’s
determination denying the default application for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Id.
99. Id. at 596-97.
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by GMAC in its complaint or in its brief.”100 The court then
took its analysis of defendant’s contact with Virginia and
expanded it to consider the same minimum contacts approach,
but with the significant difference that the relevant forum was
now the United States as a whole rather than only Virginia.101
Refining this new methodology, the Graduate Mgmt. court
set forth a new spin on the famous Zippo three-part factor
analysis for RULE 4(k)(2) purposes:
Substituting the United States as the relevant forum, the test
requires a showing in this case (i) that [the defendant] directed his
electronic activity into the United States, (ii) that he did so with the
manifest intent of engaging in business or other interactions within
the United States, and (iii) that his activity creates a potential cause
of action in a person within the United States that is cognizable in the
United States’ courts.102

Then, the Graduate Mgmt. court, reiterating its previous
holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts in
Virginia, determined that since the only evidence in the record
pertained to contacts between the defendant and Virginia, it
was therefore “apparent” that defendant had insufficient
contacts with any other single state, and that the case was
consequently appropriate for a finding of personal jurisdiction
under RULE 4(k)(2).103
Graduate Mgmt. thus provides a nearly foolproof blueprint
for plaintiffs to plead and prove, at least for the purposes of
surviving a motion to dismiss, jurisdiction over a non-U.S.
defendant in Internet intellectual property disputes. First, a
plaintiff should allege that the defendant had minimum
contacts with a particular state. In the alternative, the
plaintiff should assert that minimum contacts exist within the
United States as a whole, which thereby permits jurisdiction
under the rubric of RULE 4(k)(2).104
That is precisely what happened in the well-known
“KaZaa” case, Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster.105 There, the court held that personal jurisdiction
100. Id. at 596.
101. Id. at 597-98.
102. Id. at 597.
103. Id. at 599.
104. This would, of course, assume that there are not sufficient contacts in
any other state. However, as the Graduate Mgmt. case shows, very little is
apparently required to show that there is not another state that could exercise
jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 87-103.
105. 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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was proper under the California long arm statute, or, in the
alternative, jurisdiction was proper under RULE 4(k)(2).106
Tellingly, the court, while indicating that there were sufficient
contacts within California, made the following observation:
Finally, the Court notes that even if jurisdiction over Sharman [the
KaZaa holding company] were unavailable in California state courts,
it would nonetheless be appropriate in this Court on the basis of
Sharman’s aggregated U.S. contacts. Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permits nationwide aggregation for cases
arising under federal law, unless 1) the defendant is subject to
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state, or 2)
aggregation is expressly forbidden by the relevant law.107

Thus, these latest cases have effectively taken the concept
of RULE 4(k)(2) and vastly expanded it.
No longer is
RULE 4(k)(2) only to be applied in a situation where a
jurisdiction cannot be established in any given state. Instead,
it has become a fallback position for a plaintiff to be able to
keep a defendant in a federal court of the plaintiff’s choosing so
long as there are minimum contacts aggregated on a national
basis.
Taken together, Grokster and Swiss Am. Bank allow for
unproven allegations of minimum contacts with the United
States to suffice for the purpose of pretrial jurisdictional
discovery.108 Thus, even where no contacts are meaningfully
demonstrated, a foreign defendant will be forced to defend itself
on foreign soil for the limited purpose of engaging in pretrial
jurisdictional discovery (and quite possibly for the entire
lawsuit) based upon the most subtle of contacts with the United
States.109 Surely, it is no exaggeration to say that by virtue of
RULE 4(k)(2), and the extravagant construction placed upon it
by federal courts, jurisdiction over foreign defendants for
Internet intellectual property disputes has become nearly
guaranteed.

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1094.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-72 & 105-107
Id.
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IV. RULE 4(K)(2) AND ITS LONG-TERM EFFECT
This article has demonstrated that RULE 4(k)(2) has
dramatically escalated the potential for U.S. plaintiffs to haul
an unwilling foreign entity within the jurisdiction of the United
States judicial system for the purpose of adjudicating virtually
all intellectual property disputes involving the Internet. One
must ask what the long-term effect of this dramatic assertion of
authority will ultimately be.
The reader is reminded of the controversy that erupted in
2002 when the Australian High Court, in Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
v. Gutnick,110 held that Dow Jones & Company could be sued in
the Australian courts in a defamation case arising out of the
publication of an article involving an Australian national on its
Barron’s website.111 Under Rule 7.01 of the Victorian Rules,
Australia’s version of a long-arm jurisdictional statute,
Gutnick’s defamation claim was construed as a tort claim that
caused injury “within” Victoria as a result of a tortious act
occurring outside of the territory.112 The Court theorized that
the injury occurred within Victoria because the Dow Jones’
news article was viewable in Victoria and claims for damages
were limited to that jurisdiction.113 Consequentially, the Dow
Jones article was a “publication” and caused injury to Gutnick’s
reputation because “publication” occurred within Victoria.114
Therefore, jurisdiction was properly located within Victoria.115
Dow Jones has, not surprisingly, been condemned as being a
grossly inappropriate exercise of local jurisdiction that may
have a chilling effect on the free flow of information and create
a “spider web” of potential litigation throughout the world.116
Is the assertion of power by the Dow Jones Court any
different from the aggressive reach of RULE 4(k)(2) for Internetbased intellectual property disputes? Moreover, is it any
coincidence that Graduate Mgmt.117 was decided in January
110. (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.).
111. Dow Jones, 194 A.L.R. at 433, 435, 444-46.
112. Id. at 445-46.
113. Id. at 446.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 445-46.
116. See. e.g., BBC News, World Edition, Australia Makes Landmark Net
Ruling, (Dec. 11, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/2560683.stm (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
117. Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D.

82

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

2003, one month after the Australia High Court’s ruling in Dow
Jones? Are the courts of the world on the brink of engaging in
a “gotcha” game of mutually aggressive assertions of
jurisdiction against each other’s citizens?
These attempts at overarching authority and control over
the world’s intellectual property marketplace may well have
unintended consequences. Proponents of the view that the
United States must insist on strict regulation to bring the
Internet into compliance with U.S. intellectual property
standards may argue that the interests of the world might be
well served. Such regulation would, if successful, certainly
police the Internet and make it compliant with western notions
of intellectual property protection. However, such a position by
the United States might also lead to a contrary result: that the
rest of the world might haul U.S. citizens into their courts and
make those U.S. citizens adhere to the intellectual property
regulations of those countries.
Perhaps this contest of
jurisdiction over the Internet (which can certainly be viewed as
a truly international forum that realistically cannot and should
not be unilaterally controlled or even policed by any one
country) will eventually have no winners, only losers.
The time is now ripe for the adoption of an international
treaty for the uniform treatment of jurisdictional questions
involving disputes over intellectual property matters. The
TRIPS Agreement does not establish rules or even guidelines
for this important topic. One nascent effort to address this
issue comes from the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, an intergovernmental entity composed of
sixty-two member states (including the United States and all
members of the European Union).118 A special commission
from that organization, following exhaustive and apparently
still inconclusive negotiations, has promulgated a draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (“Jurisdiction Convention”).119 Article 12
of the Jurisdiction Convention addresses the jurisdictional
issues in intellectual property matters and provides, in
Va. 2003).
118. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Member States,
at http://www.hcch.net/e/members/members.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
119. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary
Draft Convention On Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last
visited Sept. 28, 2003).
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paragraph 4, that exclusive jurisdiction regarding patent and
trademark actions which have “as their object the registration,
validity, [or] nullity, [or revocation or infringement]”120 shall
exist in “the courts of the Contracting State in which the
deposit or registration [of the patent, trademark or other
similar rights] has been applied for, has taken place or, under
the terms of an international convention, is deemed to have
taken place.”121 The next section, paragraph 5, confusingly
provides that “[i]n relation to proceedings which have as their
object the infringement of patents, the preceding paragraph
does not exclude the jurisdiction of any other court under the
Convention or under the national law of a Contracting
State.”122
Legal commentators report that the draft is clearly an
“evolving document” which does not yet reveal a consensus as
to jurisdictional matters generally.123 Certainly, as the draft
convention reveals, no consensus has emerged as to
jurisdictional issues concerning either intellectual property
matters generally or those related to the Internet.
An alternative method for resolving jurisdictional disputes
involving the Internet would be for all agreeable countries to
stipulate, through treaty, to apply a modified conflicts of law
formula. The formula would determine not whether a country
can assert jurisdiction through a finding of minimum contacts,
but rather what country’s jurisdiction should be the one to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction because it has the most
significant relationship to the controversy. Under such a
scenario, the court where an international intellectual property
dispute concerning the Internet is brought would first be asked
to make a preliminary jurisdictional review to determine what
country and thereby what court system has the most
significant relationship to the transaction at issue and with the
parties.
To assist in this analysis, a court could use the approach
found in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflicts of Laws
(“Restatement”).124 Section 188 of the Restatement sets forth
120. Id. (substitutions in original).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See generally, Ray August, International Cyber Jurisdiction; A
Comparative Analysis, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 531, 557-58 (2002) (discussing current
developments in cyberspace jurisdiction).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971).
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the relevant factors for determining what law governs a
contract dispute.125 A modified version of this approach could
be used for determining the proper jurisdiction in an Internet
intellectual property disputes. Such a version might look like
this:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue of
intellectual property rights are determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant
relationship to the intellectual property matter in issue and the
parties.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the
contacts to be taken into account include:
(a) the place where the intellectual property rights originated,
(b) the place where the intellectual property protection is being
sought or claimed,
(c) the location where the intellectual property rights are involved,
and
(d) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place where the intellectual property rights originated, the
place where the intellectual property protection is being sought or
claimed and the location where the intellectual property rights are
involved are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually
be applied.

125. § 188, the “Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the
Parties” states:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see §
187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles
of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of
performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will
usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and
203.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §188 (1971).
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In this way, the general concepts set forth in Section 188 of
the unmodified Restatement would be used to find proper
jurisdiction for Internet intellectual property disputes. Part
one of a modified Restatement (“Modified Restatement”) would
essentially remain the same. The governing jurisdiction shall
be the one with the most significant relationship between the
intellectual property matter and the parties in dispute.
Part two of Section 188 would be modified to address
factors relating to the underlying intellectual property rather
than the underlying contract. In Section 188(2)(a), “the place of
contracting” would be replaced by “the place where the
intellectual property rights originated.”
Section 188(2)(b)
would be dropped because the “place of the negotiation of the
contract” has no direct analog with Internet relationships.
Factor (2)(b) of a Modified Restatement (i.e. replacing Section
188(2)(c) of the unmodified Restatement), would be “the place
where the intellectual property protection is being sought or
claimed” would replace “the place of performance.” Similarly,
factor (2)(c) of a Modified Restatement, “the location where the
intellectual property rights were involved,” would replace “the
location of the subject matter of the contract.” Factor (2)(d) of a
Modified Restatement would remain the same as in Section
188(2)(e) because the state of residence of the parties is
obviously relevant. Finally, part 3 of a Modified Restatement
would also remain essentially unchanged. In the case where
parts (a), (b) and (c) of a Modified Restatement point to one
jurisdiction, that jurisdiction will usually be the correct
jurisdiction for the case.
Although this framework would require refinement by
courts and/or lawmakers, it would provide a starting point for a
logical, measured and reasonable set of criteria for determining
personal jurisdiction in Internet intellectual property cases.
Until a system such as this proposed Modified Restatement is
in place, it is likely that global dueling for jurisdictional
advantage will continue unabated.
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CONCLUSION
The recent amendment to RULE 4(k)(2) provides a powerful
tool for U.S. plaintiffs in their efforts to protect U.S. based
intellectual property rights in disputes concerning the Internet.
Courts have taken a remarkably expansive and generous view
of the reach of this RULE 4(k)(2) and have allowed U.S.
plaintiffs to haul international defendants in for pretrial
jurisdictional discovery on the most minimum of allegations.
RULE 4(k)(2) no doubt fulfils a significant role in the U.S.
jurisdictional system by allowing a U.S, plaintiff to, in certain
circumstances, assert claims against a foreign national.
However, questions remain about the possible repercussions
within the global judicial system. It is certainly possible that
the early rumblings of a jurisdictional duel between countries
over intellectual property matters may escalate to all-out
jurisdictional war.
The only sure way to avoid such a
consequence is for all countries to agree to a treaty which will,
once and for all, provide a systemic and fair way for signatory
countries to determine which jurisdiction should resolve such
disputes. Unless this occurs, the jurisdictional duel will
doubtlessly continue.

